2
control the works, Chinese and foreign workmen, inspection of foreign materials, and the like. While issuing the official instructions for this appointment it is necessary at the same time to notify your corporation of the same.
Enclosure 3 in No. 1.
Liang Shih-yi to Mr. Robertson.
LIANG.
December 27, 1909.
"THE Shanhaikwan Railway Agreement, article 6, provides that during the term of the loan the engineer-in-chief shall be an Englishmen, and should occasion arise to appoint a new engineer-in-chief the corporation must be consulted with regard to his appointment. The chief engineer of the Peking-Mukden Railway, Mr. Bellingham, being now deceased, it is necessary to select another candidate for the post, and the director-general accordingly proposes to appoint district engineer Mr. Ricketts, who is qualified by his familiarity with the line, to fill the post of engineer-in-chief of the said railway.
The corporation is, therefore, hereby advised of this decision, and requested to reply without delay.
LIANG.
[B]
[This Document is the Property of His Britannic Majesty's Governmen
CHINA RAILWAYS.
CONFIDENTIAL.
overing!
REG Rece18 FEB 10] January 31.1
SECTION 3,
[3354]
(No. 45.) Sir,
No. 1.
Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.-(Received January 31.)
St. Petersburgh, January 23, 1910. M. ISVOLSKY informed me yesterday that he had handed to the United States Ambassador the Russian reply to the proposal for the internationalisation of the Manchurian railways, and also in regard to the proposed line from Chinchow to Aigun. He had just had a conversation with Mr. Rockhill on the latter question, and he had apoken quite frankly to his Excellency. He had pointed out the manner in which such a line would affect Russian interests from several points of viow, and he had not disguised from Mr. Rockhill that in his view the American proposals might raise serious difficulties with China. He had once more impressed on Mr. Rockhill that the Russian Government did not wish to agree to lines which would tap Russian lines, though they were ready to discuss the question of lines which would act as feeders. Moreover, there were the strategical questions; and if the Aigun line were to be constructed, it would compel the Russian Government to spend large sums of money in fortifying Blagovestchensk, and in taking other measures to protect their communica- tions along the Amur. I interposed the remark that if the Aigun line were neutralised or internationalised, the strategical objections would be greatly modified if not entirely removed. M. Isvolsky made an impatient gesture and said that no one would, in the event of war, pay any attention to such technicalities. He had now learnt that the concession had been actually granted by the Central Government, and he had given Mr. Rockhill clearly to understand that the Russian Government were more than surprised at such a step having been taken at this juncture. He could only repeat to me bis surprise that we had not mentioned the matter to him at an earlier date; we had spoken to Japan but had ignored Russia. I gave him the explanations with which you were good enough to provide me in your telegram No. 22 of the 15th instant, but his Excellency remarked that the fact remained that we had talked the matter over with Japan, and had considered the interests of the latter country before any mention had been made to him. Mr. Rockhill had defended the action of the United States Government by saying that they had proceeded hand-in-hand with Great Britain, and that the action of both countries was identical. I told him that my Government were remaining quite passive in the matter, and I would go further and tell him confidentially that our Minister at Peking had been instructed to take no steps until we had ascertained the views and wishes of the Russian Government. No one could accuse us of not bearing the interests of Russia carefully in mind, and we were acting in perfect loyalty towards her, even in spite of certain pressure being put upon us to take a more active line. M. Isvolsky said that we would eventually support the project. I replied that in any case we had not done so hitherto. He remarked that our capitalists would induce us to do so. I said that I did not think that this would necessarily be the case, and we could be obstinate if it were considered desirable.
His Excellency said that in any case the American proposals had had one good result. I observed that they had brought Russia and Japan closer together, and to my mind any improvement in the relations between the two countries should be welcomed. M. Isvolsky replied that this had been the case, but he was at the moment alluding to the fact that for the first time the press were almost unanimous in approving the reply which he had given to the American proposals. He had for once une bonne presse.
This remark is very characteristic, and shows how in all matters M. Isvolsky regards questions in great measure from a personal point of view. Nevertheless it would be churlish to grudge him some satisfaction at having secured the suffrages of the press, after the manner in which the public journals have, in most instances unjustly, attacked and censured his policy.
I noticed that during our conversation M. Isvolsky was somewhat irritable, and seemed disposed to revert to his original position in respect to the Aigun line. He
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